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SURVEY OF N.Y. PRACTICE
DOLE V. Dow CHEMICAL Co.
Dole v. Dow Chemical Co.: Recent developments.
The New York courts continue to struggle with the diverse reper-
cussions of Dole v. Dow Chemical Co.'80 Perhaps the most controversial
impact of the Dole system of equitable apportionment of damages
among joint tort-feasors has been in the area of intrafamily torts.
Hairston v. Broadwatera81 is the latest in a series of cases 82 involv-
ing Dole counterclaims against parents for negligent supervision of
children. The plaintiff brought an action in the Supreme Court, Nassau
County, for derivative damages and as guardian of his eight-year-old
daughter who had been hit by the defendant's automobile. The de-
fendants counterclaimed for a Dole apportionment of damages alleg-
ing parental negligence in supervising the child. The plaintiff moved
to strike the counterclaim on the ground that an indirect claim by a
child against a parent would erode family unity, would limit the child's
recovery and would subject the parent to a liability for which he was
not insured. While ultimately dismissing the counterclaim, Judge
Harnett ruled that these objections had been put to rest when the
Court of Appeals abolished the doctrine of intrafamily immunity in
Gelbman v. Gelbman.8 3 He thereby rejected the reasoning adopted
by one New York court'8 4 that intrafamily immunity survives in suits
in which no insurance is available to pay the recovery. Although he
conceded that a counterclaim against a parent for negligent supervision
"follows facilely under Dole"'' 8 5 if specific parental omissions are
pleaded, Judge Harnett concluded that the defendant's conclusory
allegations lacked the "factors of hazard and neglect"'88, necessary to
make out a tort.
Perhaps one reason for the controversy surrounding the Hairston
type counterclaim is that it places the parent in the dilemma of being
180 30 N.Y.2d 143, 282 N.E.2d 288, 331 N.Y.S.2d 382 (1972), noted in 37 ALBANY L.
Rv. 154 (1972); 47 N.Y.U.L. REv. 815 (1972); 47 ST. JOHN's L. Rxv. 185 (1972).
18173 Misc. 2d 523, 342 N.Y.S.2d 787 (Sup. Ct. Nassau County 1973) (mem.).
182 See Sorrentino v. United States, 344 F. Supp. 1308 (E.D.N.Y. 1972) (counterclaim
allowed); Holodook v. Spencer, 73 Misc. 2d 181, 540 N.Y.S.2d 311 (Sup. Ct. Columbia
County 1973) (counterclaim allowed); Collazo v. Manhattan & Bronx Surface Transit
Operating Authority, 72 Misc. 2d 946, 339 N.Y.S.2d 809 (Sup. Ct. Bronx County 1972)
(counterclaim disallowed); Marrero v. Just Cab Corp., 71 Misc. 2d 474, 336 N.Y.S.2d 301
(Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1972) (counterclaim disallowed).
183 23 N.Y.2d 434,245 N.E.2d 192, 297 N.Y.S.2d 529 (1969).
184 See Collazo v. Manhattan & Bronx Surface Transit Operating Authority, 72 Misc.
2d 946, 339 N.Y.S.2d 809 (Sup. Ct. Bronx County 1972).
185 73 Misc. 2d at 527, 842 N.Y.S.2d at 791.
186 Id. at 533, 342 N.Y.S.2d at 797.
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unable to pursue the extrafamilial defendant without risking out-of-
pocket liability for part of the damages.' 8 7 Thus, the prospect of a Dole
counterclaim may either deter the bringing of the suit altogether or
cause the parent to hinder the proceedings once the counterclaim is
interposed. 88 The result may be that the negligent extrafamilial de-
fendant will go free and the child will go uncompensated. It should
be noted that these considerations do not apply to the parent's action
in his own behalf for medical expenses and loss of the child's services.
The parent's contributory negligence being a total bar to recovery of
these damages,8 9 there is no threat that the parent will be forced to
make an out-of-pocket contribution to the recovery. Furthermore, as
Judge Harnett noted in Hairston,90 even in the child's action for pain
and suffering where parental hindrance is a possibility, the situation
differs little from that presented in the direct intrafamily suits allowed
under Gelbman.
One commentator has argued that an indirect intrafamily suit via
Dole counterclaim does differ from a direct intrafamily suit in its
effect on family unity.191 The argument is that in the case of a direct
suit, family members themselves have chosen to come into court, either
to recover from an insurer or to recover from each other after family
unity has already broken down. By contrast, when a Dole counterclaim
for negligent supervision is successfully interposed, the extrafamilial
defendant is allowed to pit family members against each other without
their consent. The counterclaim should be disallowed, the commenta-
tor asserts, to preserve for the family members their freedom of choice
concerning litigation of family controversies. The apparent conclusion
is that the extrafamilial defendant should pay all the damages regard-
less of his relative degree of fault in the interest of preserving amicable
relations between parent and child.
Those objecting to the negligent supervision counterclaim on the
grounds of possible parental hindrance or disruption of family unity
appear oblivious to the substantive rights of the defendant. Under
187 If the parent is held liable for part of the child's damages, he may be compelled
to make payments into a separate guardianship or trust account. See CPLR 1201, 1206.
188 Judge Harnett listed this as one of the three fears invoked by the prospect of
child-parent tort liability. Also listed were the possibilities that the child's rights would
be impaired and that the parent would use the child's recovery to pay his own debt. He
could see no reason why the Dole claim of negligent supervision posed a unique threat
in these areas. 73 Misc. 2d at 530-31, 342 N.Y.S.2d at 794-95.
189 See Juszczal v. City of New York, 32 App. Div. 2d 824, 302 N.Y.S.2d 375 (2d Dep't
1969) (mem.).
190 73 Misc. 2d at 531, 342 N.Y.S.2d at 759.
191 Dachs, Seider v. Roth Upstaged by Dole v. Dow Chemical, 169 N.Y.L.J. 22, Jan.
31, 1973, at 1, col. 5.
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Dole, one joint tort-feasor is entitled to have other joint tort-feasors
pay their fair share of the damages. This right should not be overrid-
den because a close relationship exists between another tort-feasor and
the injured party. The parent should be able to foresee the possibility
of a Dole counterclaim. He is, therefore, free to protect his own family
unity by foregoing the action or to proceed against the extrafamilial
defendant, assuming the risk of a counterclaim. Should a counterclaim
be interposed, procedural means are available to deal with the parent's
conflict of interest.192
Another fear engendered by the negligent supervision Dole claim
is that its allowance will result in a flood of counterclaims in infant in-
jury cases. 193 This consideration led one court to hold that the counter-
claim is subject to dismissal if it does not allege "special circum-
stances."' 94 This requirement is near to Judge Harnett's possibly overly
strict 9 5 condition that specific "factors of hazard and neglect" be
alleged.
Allegations of "hazard and neglect" were not lacking in Orphan
v. Relyea9 8 where an infant was injured when a sauna heater ex-
ploded. The infant's mother brought an action in the Supreme Court,
Ulster County, against the supplier of propane gas used in the heater.
The supplier, in turn, brought a third-party Dole action against the
infant's father who was allegedly negligent in igniting the stove. As in
Hairston, the court held that no vestiges of intrafamily immunity
barred the Dole claim. 97 In Orphan, however, the specific allegations
of negligence in igniting the heater left no room for a dismissal on the
ground of insufficient pleading. The court accordingly allowed the
counterclaim despite the father's protestations that he was without lia-
bility insurance.
A related issue which has arisen under Dole in the context of in-
direct intrafamily claims involves Insurance Law section 167(3)198 which
provides that no liability insurance policy shall be deemed to insure
192 The parent may be given leave to retire as guardian and a new guardian appointed
in his place. See Sorrentino v. United States, 344 F. Supp. 1308 (E.D.N.Y. 1972).
193 See Bilgore v. Rennie, 72 Misc. 2d 639, 340 N.YS.2d 212 (Sup. Ct. Monroe County
1973); Marrero v. Just Cab Corp., 71 Misc. 2d 474, 336 N.Y.S.2d 301 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County
1972).
'94 Marrero v. Just Cab Corp., 71 Misc. 2d 474, 477, 336 N.Y.S.2d 301, 304 (Sup. Ct.
N.Y. County 1972).
195 Dean Joseph M. McLaughlin argues that Hairston sets out a stricter standard of
particularity than is required in ordinary negligence actions. McLaughlin, New York Trial
Practice, 169 N.Y.L.J. 92, May 11, 1973, at 1, col. 1.
196 73 Misc. 2d 1098, 343 N.Y.S.2d 537 (Sup. Ct. Ulster County 1978).
197 Id. at 1099, 843 N.Y.S.2d at 538.
198 N. Y. INs. LAw § 167(3) (McKinney 1966).
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against liability incurred because of death or injury to the insured's
spouse. In Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. v. Delosh 99 an insured was
operating a motorcycle with his wife as passenger when he collided
with a truck. In an action by the insured and his wife against the
driver-owner of the truck, each spouse sought damages for personal in-
juries and derivative damages for injury to the other spouse. The truck
driver commenced a third-party action against the husband for a Dole
apportionment of any damages recovered in the wife's action. This
prompted the husband's insurer to bring an action to disclaim the ob-
ligation to defend and indemnify the husband in the third-party suit.
Denying the insurer's motion for summary judgment, the court rea-
soned that the intent of section 167(3) is to prevent collusive intra-
family suits.2 0 Since both spouses were seeking large recoveries for
their own personal injuries and neither spouse's suit would be success-
ful if the extrafamilial defendant's negligence was not proved, the
court saw little possibility of fraud.201 While conceding that the third-
party action was literally within Insurance Law section 167(3), the
court held that the harsh result of a literal application justified re-
examining the legislative intent.202
Aetna demonstrates the need for the adaptation of insurance pro-
visions to accommodate the indirect intrafamily claims which will pro-
199 73 Misc. 2d 275, 341 N.Y.S.2d 465 (Sup. Ct. St. Lawrence County 1973).
200 Id. at 278, 341 N.Y.S.2d at 468, citing New Amsterdam Cas. Co. v. Stecker, 3 N.Y.
2d 1, 143 N.E.2d 357, 163 N.Y.S.2d 626 (1957); Employers' Liability Assurance Corp. v.
Aresty, 11 App. Div. 2d 331, 205 N.Y.S.2d 711 (Ist Dep't 1960), aff'd mem., 11 N.Y.2d 696,
180 N.E.2d 916, 225 N.Y.S.2d 764 (1962); Katz v. Wessel, 207 Misc. 456, 139 N.Y.S.2d 564
(Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1955).
201 The court distinguished cases where an injured party's recovery depended upon
proof of his own spouse's negligence. As examples the court cited Reis v. Economy Hotels
and Restaurants Purveyors, Inc., 4 Misc. 2d 146, 155 N.Y.S.2d 713 (Sup. Ct. Queens County
1956); Feinman v. Bernard Rice Sons, Inc., 2 Misc. 2d 86, 133 N.Y.S.2d 639 (Sup. Ct.
Bronx County 1954), af'd mem., 285 App. Div. 926, 139 N.Y.S.2d 884 (Ist Dep't 1955)
appeal dismissed, 309 N.Y. 750, 128 N.E.2d 797 (1955) (mem.); Peka Inc. v. Kaye, 208
Misc. 1003, 145 N.Y.S.2d 156 (Sup. Ct. Bronx County), rev'd on other grounds, I App. Div.
2d 879, 150 N.Y.S.2d 774 (Ist Dep't 1956). In these cases plaintiffs brought actions against
the owners of automobiles driven by the plantiffs' spouses. The courts held, under Insur-
ance Law section 167(3), that insurers were not obligated to defend and indemnify the
negligent spouses when the owners sought recovery over from them. It is obvious that in
this situation the negligent spouse will have a financial interest in losing the lawsuit. Cf.
Smith v. Employer's Fire Ins. Co., 72 Misc. 2d 524, 340 N.Y.S.2d 12 (Sup. Ct. Tompkins
County 1972), where the court held section 167(3) applicable in a case identical to Aetna
except for the fact that the insured husband was not seeking recovery in his own behalf.
The rationale in Aetna appears to apply with almost equal force to Smith. The wife in
Smith would not be successful unless the defendant in her action was proved negligent.
The insured husband against whom the defendant sought recovery over had nothing to
gain and much to lose by fraudulently trying to lose the lawsuit.
202 The court noted that the effect of permitting the husband's insurer to disclaim
liability might be to discourage the wife from attempting to collect her full damages. The
court doubted that the Legislature intended such a result.
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liferate under Dole. The Gelbman-Dole-Kelly revolution is "notifica-
tion to the legislature and state insurance officials that time has
marched on in familial situations, and the need is at hand to review
and revise socially unresponsive institutional practices." 20 3
By creating a procedural means whereby one joint tort-feasor can
bring another joint tort-feasor into an action, Dole has shaken various
immunities from direct negligence suits previously enjoyed by certain
types of parties. One example is the supposed post-Gelbman intra-
family immunity unsuccessfully raised by parents in the previously
discussed Hairston and Orphan cases. Another is the immunity created
by the ninety-day notice of claim requirement of General Municipal
Law section 50-e. The question raised in the 50-e context is analogous
to that posed by indirect intrafamily claims. When a plaintiff com-
mences a malpractice action against both a county and a private hos-
pital and the action against the county hospital is discontinued be-
cause of the plaintiff's failure to give the required ninety-day notice of
claim, may the private hospital implead the county hospital for a Dole
apportionment of damages? In Zillman v. Meadowbrook Hospital,204
the Supreme Court, Nassau County, answered affirmatively. Prior to
Dole, the Court of Appeals ruled in a similar situation °5 that a third-
party action for total indemnification was not barred by the failure of
the original plaintiff to give the required notice of claim. Judge Har-
nett reasoned in Zillman that the same rule should apply to a Dole
claim for partial indemnification.
A different type of immunity which may be weakened as a result
of Dole arises out of the rule set down in Gochee v. Wagner.206 Under
Gochee, when 0 is the owner of and is a passenger in a vehicle driven
by D which collides with a vehicle driven by a stranger (S), the negli-
gence of D is imputed to 0 in O's action against S. In Ayton v.
Acosta,207 0 brought an action against S for personal injury and prop-
erty damages. S brought a third-party action against D seeking a Dole
apportionment of any damages which might be recovered by 0. The
New York City Civil Court dismissed the third-party complaint, cor-
rectly reasoning that under Gochee such a claim is superfluous. Any
negligence on D's part would be imputed to 0 thus defeating O's
203 Hairston v. Broadwater, 73 Misc. 2d 523, 531, 342 N.Y.S.2d 787, 795 (Sup. Ct.
Nassau County 1973) (mem.).
204 73 Misc. 2d 726, 342 N.Y.S.2d 302 (Sup. Ct. Nassau County 1973).
205 Vastrey Service Corp. v. Board of Elec., 2 N.Y.2d 413, 141 N.E2d 565, 161 N.Y.S.2d
52 (1957).
200 257 N.Y. 344, 178 N.E. 553 (1931).
207- Misc. 2d -, 342 N.Y.S.2d 295 (N.Y.C. Civ. Ct. Queens County 1973).
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claim. If D were at all at fault, there would be no recovery to appor-
tion. However, the court acknowledged the possibility that if 0 had
initially sued D, D might then achieve a Dole apportionment of dam-
ages by impleading S.2 08 This indirect action against S would present
a severe challenge to the Gochee rule. In ruling on the permissibility
of D's impleader action, a court would be faced with a choice between
D's rights under Dole and S's right to claim the Gochee immunity. In
all probability, Dole would prevail, particularly in a case where S was
largely at fault. If Gochee can indeed be circumvented in this way, its
future vitality is certainly in doubt.2°9
While the question of Dole's applicability to a personal injury
action based on breach of warranty or strict tort liability is not settled,
recent cases indicate that it will be extended to these areas.210 In a
typical product liability case, the injured user of the defective product
brings a combined negligence and breach of warranty action against
his immediate retail seller, the manufacturer, and sometimes inter-
mediate distributors or wholesalers. 211 In the pre-Dole era, each of the
defendant enterprises in the chain of distribution was entitled to full
indemnity from its immediate seller, if that seller was found to have
breached a warranty. Full indemnity was available on a warranty
theory even when the enterprise seeking to be indemnified was itself
guilty of negligence.21 2 The ultimate result was that the full loss was
born by the first enterprise in the chain to breach a warranty. The
transformation which Dole promises in the strict liability area is as
radical as that effected in the negligence field. Rather than placing the
full loss on the enterprise at the top of the distribution chain, a court
applying Dole would distribute liability among several enterprises in
accordance with relative fault.
The first case to take this approach appears to have been Walsh v.
Ford Motor Co. 21 8 wherein the plaintiff, injured as a result of a defec-
208 The Gochee imputation does not apply when the owner-passenger sues his own
driver. See Lamoureaux v. Crowe, 6 App. Div. 2d 930, 176 N.Y.S.2d 22 (3d Dep't 1958)
(mem.); Urquhart v. McEvoy, 204 Misc. 426, 126 N.Y.S.2d 539 (Sup. Ct. Monroe County
1953). D has the right under Dole to implead other tort-feasors responsible for O's injuries.
209 See Schwab, Dole v. Dow Chemical Co.: A Preliminary Analysis, 45 N.Y. ST. B.J.
144, 159 (1973).
21o See Coons v. Washington Mirror Works, Inc., 344 F. Supp. 653 (S.D.N.Y. 1972);
Rubel v. Stackrow, 72 Misc. 2d 734, 340 N.Y.S.2d 691 (Sup. Ct. Albany County 1973).
211 Warranty actions against wholesalers and manufacturers by consumers became
possible when the Court of Appeals abolished the requirement of privity in Goldberg v.
Kollsman Instrument Corp., 12 N.Y.2d 432, 191 N.E.2d 81, 240 N.Y.S.2d 592 (1963).
212 See Schwartz v. Macrose Lumber & Trim Co., 50 Misc. 2d 547, 270 N.Y.S.2d 875,
50 Misc. 2d 1055, 272 N.Y.S.2d 227 (Sup. Ct. Queens County 1966), rev'd on other grounds,
29 App. Div. 2d 781, 287 N.Y.S.2d 706 (2d Dep't 1968), aff'd, 24 N.Y.2d 856, 248 N.E.2d
910, 301 N.Y.S.2d 91 (1969) (mem.).
213 70 Misc. 2d 1031, 335 N.Y.S.2d 110 (Sup. Ct. Nassau County 1972) (mem.).
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tive automobile carburetor, recovered a judgment in both negligence
and warranty against Ford and one of its dealers. The dealer sought
full indemnity from Ford by cross-claim on two theories. First, the
dealer argued that its negligence in failing to inspect the automobile
was only passive as opposed to Ford's active negligence in manufac-
ture. The court denied this claim, finding that the dealer had been
guilty of active negligence. Second, the dealer sought full indemnity
based on Ford's breach of warranty. The court took the novel step of
denying full indemnity on the warranty theory also and apportioning
damages in accordance with relative fault as determined in the negli-
gence action. The court reasoned as follows:
Even though the Dole case was concerned only with a negligence
action, the principle developed in that case should also be and is
applied to these implied warranty causes of action because they
arose only because of defendant's negligence.214
Thus, in Walsh it was the adjudication of negligence which justified
and formed the basis for the apportionment of damages.
The Walsh court was able to apportion damages in accordance
with relative fault because a jury had found the defendants negligent
and because the defendants had stipulated for a court determination
of the dealer's cross-claim. What of the case where the plaintiff fails
to prove negligence and recovers solely in breach of warranty? Is an
apportionment mandated despite the absence of any proof of negligence
or relative fault and, if so, what is the basis for such an apportionment?
This issue was presented recently in Noble v. Desco Shoe Corp.2 15 The
plaintiff therein recovered a judgment for personal injury damages
against the retailer, supplier and manufacturer of a defective pair of
shoes. Recovery was predicated solely on breach of warranty, the trial
court having dismissed the negligence counts in the complaint. The
trial court granted the retailer full indemnity on its cross-claim against
the supplier. On appeal, the Appellate Division, First Department, re-
manded the case to the trial court for an apportionment under Dole,
holding that "no distinction should be drawn between actions grounded
in negligence and those based on breach of warranty."21 6 The court
gave no hint, however, of how the trial court would arrive at such an
apportionment after having dismissed the plaintiff's negligence action,
presumably on a finding that no defendant had been proved prima
facie negligent. Perhaps in such cases a second trial will be necessary
with co-defendants presenting evidence on the issue of relative fault.
214 Id. at 1033, 335 N.Y.&2d at 114.
215 41 App. Div. 2d 908, 343 N.Y.S.2d 134 (1st Dep't 1973).
216 Id. at 910, 343 N.Y.S.2d at 156.
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In Codling v. Paglia,217 the Court of Appeals faced a hybrid of the
Walsh and Noble cases. In Codling, a two-car accident case, the plain-
tiffs brought an action against the driver and manufacturer of the de-
fective automobile with which they had collided. After settling their
negligence action against the defendant driver prior to trial, the plain-
tiffs recovered against the manufacturer solely in breach of warranty.
Although the defendant driver had settled with the plaintiffs, he had
reserved a cross-claim seeking full recovery over from the manufacturer.
This cross-claim was successful in the trial court but was dismissed
prior to the Dole decision by the Appellate Division, Third Depart-
ment.218 The dismissal was appealed to the Court of Appeals, Dole
having been decided in the interim. The appeal presented the pos-
sibility of a Dole apportionment between two defendants, one whose
liability arose from negligence and another who had been held liable
solely in breach of warranty.219 Unfortunately, the Court opted not to
avail itself of this opportunity, choosing not to apply Dole retroac-
tively in this particular case. In light of the defendant driver's pre-
Dole settlement the Court reasoned that "it would be inappropriate
on these facts to undo what has been done and, on the basis of present
law, to nullify actions taken by the parties in reliance on the law as it
then stood. '220
It is hoped that the Court will soon have a more appropriate op-
portunity to clarify procedures for apportionment of damages in strict
liability cases. Strict product liability is designed to place the costs of
consumer goods manufacturing on an enterprise able to bear them. In
many cases, the distribution of liability achieved by invoking the Dole
rule of apportionment will further this purpose by spreading the loss
among several enterprises. At the same time, the plaintiff will retain
his right to recover on a strict liability basis without having to prove
negligence.
The Court of Appeals' refusal to apply Dole retroactively in
Codling must be attributed to the peculiar circumstance there present
of a private settlement entered into in reliance on prior law. Prior to
Codling the Court of Appeals had held Dole applicable to cases pend-
ing at the date of the Dole decision. 221 The most widely held view
217 32 N.Y.2d 330, 298 N.E.2d 622, 345 N.Y.S.2d 461 (1973).
218 38 App. Div. 2d 154, 327 N.Y.S.2d 978 (3d Dep't 1972).
219 A Dole apportionment was made in this situation in Coons v. Washington Mirror
Works Inc., 344 F. Supp. 653 (S.D.N.Y. 1972).
220 32 N.Y.2d at 334, 298 N.E.2d at 630, 845 N.Y.S.2d at 471.
221 See Kelly v. Long Island Lighting Co., 31 N.Y.2d 25, 286 N.E.2d 241, 334 N.Y.S.
2d 851 (1972); Frey v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 30 N.Y.2d 764, 284 N.E.2d 579, 333 N.Y.S.2d
425 (1972) (mem.).
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among the lower courts appears to be that "[t]he Dole decision was in-
tended to be remedial in nature and is applicable retrospectively. 222
The Appellate Division, Second Department, aligned itself with this
view by upholding Dole's retroactivity in two recent cases. In Liebman
v. County of Westchester,223 third-party plaintiffs appealed the dismis-
sal of their third-party complaint served in response to the Dole deci-
sion after the liability segment of a bifurcated trial was completed.
The Second Department reinstated the third-party complaint, holding
that Dole applies to cases which were still in the judicial process on the
date of the Dole decision. A third-party complaint was similarly rein-
stated in Mosca v. Pensky224 where a third-party plaintiff, seeking to
take advantage of the Dole decision, moved to reargue a motion to dis-
miss his third-party complaint which had been granted seventeen
months earlier. In affirming the lower court's reinstatement, the
Second Department made no mention of Glombaski v. B. & 0. R.R.225
where the Supreme Court, Monroe County, refused to reinstate a third-
party complaint in similar circumstances.
The finality achieved by the pre-Dole settlement in Codling
should not be taken as a touchstone for future settlements. The sub-
stantive rights given the defendant by Dole have undermined the
finality of partial settlements in multi-defendant negligence actions. A
defendant seeking to settle an action should be aware that a co-defend-
ant not joined in a settlement can force a Dole apportionment by cross-
claim. Any settlement which leaves this possibility open fails in its pur-
pose. This point was underscored in Michelucci v. Bennett22 where a
plaintiff sued three defendants in an automobile accident case. Two
separate settlements were entered into, the first between two defend-
ants and the plaintiff and the second between two co-defendants. Al-
though all the parties had been privy to at least one of the settlements,
the court on two separate motions2 7 refused to dismiss third-party
claims seeking Dole apportionments because neither of the settlements
included all co-defendants.
For all its flexibility, the Dole rule does have some limitations on
222 Meade v. Roberts, 71 Misc. 2d 120, 122, 335 N.Y.S.2d 349, 352 (Sup. Ct. Broome
County 1972). See, e.g., Hain v. Hewlett Arcade, Inc., 40 App. Div. 2d 991, 888 N.YS.2d
791 (2d Dep't 1972) (mem.); Brown v. City of New York, 40 App. Div. 2d 785, 387 N.Y.S.2d
685 (Ist Dep't 1972); Moreno v. Galdorisi, 89 App. Div. 2d 450, 886 N.Y.S.2d 646 (2d Dep't
1972); Sanchez v. Hertz Rental Corp., 70 Misc. 2d 449, 383 N.Y.S.2d 699 (Sup. Ct. Kings
County 1972).
223 41 App. Div. 2d 756, 341 N.YS.2d 567 (2d Dep't 1973) (mem.).
22441 App. Div. 2d 775, 342 N.YS.2d 76 (2d Dep't 1973) (mem.).
225 72 Misc. 2d 552, 888 N.Y.S.2d 1004 (Sup. Ct. Monroe County 1972) (mem.).
226 73 Misc. 2d 621, 341 N.Y.S.2d 887 (Sup. Ct. Washington County 1978).
227 The first motion appears at 71 Misc. 2d 347, 385 N.Y.S.2d 967.
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its applicability. As Dole applies to joint tort-feasors there may be no
basis for a Dole apportionment when defendants commit separate and
successive acts of negligence. In Szarewicz v. Alboro Crane Rental
Corp.,228 a plaintiff brought an action against defendants whose negli-
gence allegedly caused his original injury at a construction site and
against doctors for subsequent malpractice. The Supreme Court, Bronx
County, disallowed the doctors' Dole cross-claim against the other de-
fendants, reasoning that there was no legal basis upon which the doc-
tors could be held liable for damages caused by other tort-feasors prior
to the alleged malpractice. As the court noted, Dole applies where a
"third party is found to have been responsible for a part, but not all of
the negligence for which the defendant is cast in damages .... ,,229 At
the same time, the court allowed the defendants allegedly responsible
for the original injury to cross-claim against the doctors for that por-
tion of damages attributable to the malpractice. Such an apportion-
ment was allowed even prior to Dole because, under established tort
principles, a tort-feasor is responsible for all damages flowing from his
wrongful act.280
The law of negligence in New York presently exists in a curious
state of limbo, halfway between the former strict rule forbidding all
apportionments and the system of comparative negligence certain to
come in the future. While defendants are given the right to share lia-
bility with others responsible for the plaintiffs' damages, the plaintiff
is forced to bear his whole loss if he is at all at fault. A number of
lower New York courts have found this incongruity insupportable and
have held that the Court of Appeals had abolished the contributory
negligence rule in the Dole case.2 1 These decisions came prior to the
Court of Appeals' recent reaffirmance of the doctrine in Codling v.
Paglia.2 32 While acknowledging the judicial origins of contributory
negligence and the severe criticism surrounding it, the Court found it-
self "not prepared at this time to substitute some formula of compara-
tive negligence. ' 283 For the time being, the Court has left this task to
the Legislature.
228 73 Misc. 2d 232, 341 N.Y.S.2d 155 (Sup. Ct. Bronx County 1973).
229 Id. at 234, 341 N.Y.S.2d at 156, quoting Dole v. Dow Chemical Co., 30 N.Y.2d 143,
148, 282 N.E.2d 288, 292, 331 N.Y.S.2d 382, 387 (1972).
280 Derby v. Prewitt, 12 N.Y.2d 100, 187 N.E.2d 556, 236 N.Y.S.2d 953 (1962); Milks
v. McIver, 264 N.Y. 267, 190 N.E. 487 (1934).
231 Dixon v. Knickerbocker Drivurself, Inc., 72 Misc. 2d 1025, 341 N.Y.S.2d 150 (City
Ct. Albany County 1973); Long v. Zientowski, 73 Misc. 2d 719, 340 N.Y.S.2d 652 (Dunkirk
City Ct. 1973); Berenger v. Gottlieb, 72 Misc. 2d 349, 338 N.Y.S.2d 319 (N.Y.C. Civ. Ct.
Kings County 1972); Murray v. Lidell, Index No. 1221-69 (N.Y.C. Civ. Ct. Richmond
County, Sept. 27, 1972).
232 32 N.Y.2d 330, 298 N.E.2d 622, 345 N.Y.S.2d 461 (1973).
283 Id. at 345, 298 N.E.2d at 630, 345 N.Y.S.2d at 472.
